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Legal Services and Landlord-Tenant Litigation:
A Critical Analysis
During the eight years since its establishment, most of the contro-
versy surrounding the Legal Services Program has centered on its suits
against state and local governments and on behalf of "law reform."'
Little or no serious study has been given to the far more common
types of Legal Services cases involving domestic relations, commercial
disputes, or landlord-tenant controversies. 2
This Note will examine the impact of one Legal Services Program,
the New Haven Legal Assistance Association (LAA)3 on landlord-ten-
ant disputes. The Note's findings on LAA's impact on this one area of
law are in no way conclusive as to its general performance or to the
overall value of Legal Services in the nation.4 Nevertheless, they may
suggest questions for further study in other programs and other types
of litigation.
1. See Note, The Legal Services Corporation: Curtailing Political Interference, 81
YALE L.J. 231 (1971).
2. See, e.g., Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J.
1317, 1380-33 (1964); Johnson, An Analysis of the Legal Services Program. 38 Miss. L REV.
419, 427 (1966); Shriver, The OEO and Legal Services, 51 A.B.,.J. 1064, 1066 (195).
An exception to the general tendencies of commentators has been a series of articles
by Geoffrey Hazard. See generally Hazard, The Law Reforming in the Anti.Poverty
Effort, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 242 (1970); Hazard, Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36
U. Cm. L. REV. 699 (1969); Hazard, Rationing Justice, 8 J. LAw & Eco.. 1 (1965). The
most ambitious evaluative effort to date has been the 'Kettele Report." 1 EVALUATION OF
OFFIcE OF ECONOMIC OrowrUrNY LEGAL SmVcES PRoGRmt, FINAL REImOnT (1971), pre-
pared for the Evaluation Division, Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), by the John
D. Kettelle Corporation [hereinafter cited as the Kette le Report]. The usefulness of
the report was undermined by objections of Legal Services officials to researchers' re-
quests to interview former Legal Services clients. Id. at cit. 3, at 7, ch. 5, at 1-5. An
OEO working paper stressed that, "No mention is made of the impact of the programs
in alleviating poverty, a noteworthy omission." Legal Services: Goals and Criteria for
Evaluation 12 (1972) (emphasis in original).
3. LAA is funded by five sources: Operating on an overall 1971 budget of M9,876,
it received $364,129 from OEO and $119.021 from the federal Model Cities Program.
Connecticut contributed $141,241 and the remainder was contributed from "other"
sources (including some $15,360 in VISTA funds and from unspecified Federal work-
study programs). Information 1971 (mimeographed pamphlet distributed by L%A). LA
is one of the oldest Legal Services Programs in the United States. Pamphlet, New
Haven Legal Assistance Association, Inc. Needs Your Help Nowl (pamphlet). See CON.
FERENCE PROCEEINGs, THE ExTENsioN OF LEGAL SERVICES TO TIlE POOR, sponsored by the
HEW Welfare Administration, Office of Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development.
November 12-14, 1964, Washington, D.C. This article was substantially reprinted in
Parker, The New Haven Neighborhood Model, 25 LEGAL AID BRIEFCsE 164 (1965). The
program was also discussed in Legal Services in Connecticut Under the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity, 41 CONN. B.J. 577 (1967).
4. One of the major problems in analyzing the Program is the imprecision of its
goals. A recent OEO working paper, Legal Services: Goals and Criteria for Evaluation,
at 4, characterized the goals of the Program as "hopelessly vague," and then noted:
It is clear that immense discretion is left . . . to decide the emphasis and direction
of local programs. Although a grantee [legal services program] cannot totally ignore
one or more of the goals, there is no clear norm by which they can be judged.
Moreover, the problems of distinguishing between the goals is also quite difficult.
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I. LAA's Impact on Summary Process Litigation.
A. The Data
Connecticut, like many other states,5 has established a procedure to
provide for the rapid disposition of landlord-tenant disputes over the
possession of leased premises." Under this procedure pleadings and mo-
tions must be filed at intervals of not more than three days,' and tri-
able issues are limited to a few specifically enumerated in the statutes.8
The involvement of LAA attorneys in summary process cases clearly
tends to increase the amount of time required for disposition of the
action. An examination of court records for all summary process ac-
tions initiated in New Haven during the last six months of 19719
5. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 1159-79a (1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 57, §§ 1-22
(Smith-Hurd 1952); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACIONS §§ 701-67 (1963); TEX. REV. Ci. STAT. ANN.
arts. 3973-75b (1966); Tx. R. Civ. P. 738-55.
6. CONN. GN. STAT. REV. §§ 52-532-52-549 (1968), as amended, §§ 52-532 (Supp.
1969), 52-532a (Supp. 1971), 52-534 (Supp. 1969), 52-540A (Supp. 1973), 52-542 (Supp. 1971).
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-534 (Supp. 1969).
8. The only triable issues contemplated in the action as between landlord and tenant
are whether the lease has terminated by lapse of time, by nonpayment of rent if an
oral lease, or by express stipulation (which may include nonpayment as a cause for evic-
tion, see Webb v. Ambler, 125 Conn. 543, 7 A.2d 228 (1939)) if a written lease. CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-532 (Supp. 1969). (The landlord also has an action if the tenant
has been convicted of using the premises for illegal or immoral purposes. Id. at § 52-539
(1968).)
The landlord may secure a judgment of possession by provin; that: (1) the defendant
is his lessee and is holding-over after the lease has terminated in one of the ways listed
above; (2) the defendant has been properly served with a Notice to Quit the premises:(3) the defendant is holding-over after the time period to be specified in the Notice to
Quit; and, (4) the defendant has no title to the property. Id. at § 52-534 (Supp. 1969). The
policy of the statutes is thus to limit the issues in the action to a few simple matters,
Davidson v. Poli, 102 Conn. 692, 695, 129 A. 716, 717 (1925); Dreyfuss v. World Art
Group, Inc., 6 Conn. Cir. 309, 310, 272 A.2d 144, 145 (1970), and allow the landlord to
regain possession without suffering delay or expense. Housing Authority v. Alproves,
19 Conn. Supp. 37, 39, 109 A.2d 884, 885 (1954). Nevertheless, both legislative and ju-
dicial decisions have as a practical matter qualified the landlord's right to evict. First,
the landlord who uses summary process may recover only a judgment of possession; lie
cannot sue for damages. CONN. GEN. STA. REV. § 52-534 (Supp. 1969). Second, the land-
lord may not engage in retaliatory eviction, e.g., as punishment for the tenant's con-
tacting public officials regarding the landlord's violation of housing, health, or other
state statutes or regulations. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-540a (Supp. 1973). Third, the
courts have not been reluctant to grant equitable relief, e.g., in cases of fraud on the
part of the landlord. Greenberg, The Action of Summary Process, 33 CONN. l.J. 62,
73 (1959). Finally, in certain circumstances the court may stay execution of the judgment
for up to six months. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 52-543-52.546 (1968). Finally, the
landlord may not evict tenants because of nonpayment of rent from certain bit Iungs
for which no inspection certificate has been issued. Id. at § 19-371 (Supp. 1973); Dreamy
Hollow Apartments Corp. v. Lewis, 4 Conn. Cir. 355, 232 A.2d 346 (1967).
9. The docket books summarizing individual case files were used as the source of
most of the data discussed below. This Note focuses on litigation involving residential
leases and excludes commercial leases (less than ten percent of the sample) because
neither the scope of obligations between the parties nor the interests at stake In the
litigation are comparable between the two types of tenancies.
In determining the date of the initiation of the action, the Note uses the date that
the landlord's complaint was returned to the court (the complaint and Notice to Quit
having already been served). CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-532 (Supp. 1969). In deter.
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indicates that disposition of the action took an average of 1.4 times as
long in cases where private counsel represented the tenant-defendant,
as compared with cases in which the tenant had no counsel at all.
However, a similar comparison of cases where the tenant was repre-
sented by LAA with counsel-less cases indicates cases took 2.7 times
as long to reach disposition. 10 Or, stated differently, the additional
mining the date of disposition, it uses the date of judgment (where available) whether
by default, agreement, 'or stipulation between the parties, or by trial on the mcrits.
However, in many cases no judgment was ever entered; in some, the last dod.ct entry
was a stipulation or agreement, though there was no subsequent entry of a corresponding
judgment. It seems reasonable to infer, a year and a half later, that in such cases
the stipulation represented the practical termination of the action. Hcnce the filing of
the stipulation or agreement in such instances is considered to represent the date of
disposition. In other cases the last docket entry is simply the withdrawal of the action
from court. Again, the date of such a filing is used as the date of disposition.
10. Excluding cases in which no judgment, stipulation, or withdrawal was filed, and
those involving non-residential leases, computations of disposition time were based on
352 of the 519 cases initially examined. See note 9 supra. The comparison of the length
of the actions was as follows:
TABLE I
Represented by Represented
Unrepresented Private Counsel' by LAA
1970 *Time Cases OTime Cases OTime Cases
July 57 31 51 5 134 16
August 34 39 56 4 67 16
September 18 36 15 1 128 13
October 32 48 17 3 72 17
November 30 48 33 3 74 17
December 34 35 77 2 55 18
Mean: 32 44 87
Median: 26 27 75
Total cases: 237 18 97
# average number of days from initiation to disposition
10. While Table I reveals monthly variations in disposition time, the mean figures
demonstrate that the overall effect of LAA representation was to make the disposition
time of the action 2.7 times as long as when the tenant had no counsel, while the in-
troduction of private counsel resulted in a factor of delay of only 1.4. A consideration
of the median, in order to avoid the effect of aberrant cases, indicates that L-A-rep-
resented actions took 2.8 times as long as unrepresented cases, while privately-repre-
sented actions required almost no additional time (a factor of only 1.04).
Table II shows the percentage distribution of the cases in the sample. The actions





(days): 1-7 8-15 16-30 31-45 46-60 61-90 91-120 121-180 180+
LAA
rep-
resented: 2.1 3.1 10.3 14.4 13.4 20.6 125 12.5 11.3
Privately
rep-
resented: 11.1 11.1 27.8 11.1 11.1 22.2 0.0 5.6 0.0
Unrep-
resented: 13.1 15.2 31.2 23.2 5.1 8.0 3.0 1.3 0.0
Chi-square variance tests showed the obviously perceived differences in the disposition
time to be statistically significant.
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time required for disposition that resulted when the tenant was rep-
resented by an attorney was over four times longer when the attorney
was from LAA as compared with when he was a private lawyer.1
The primary factor leading to this differential appears to be LAA's
use of the procedural complexities 12 available in summary process
litigation.13 However, despite such efforts, the landlord almost inevi-
tably obtains judgment of possession.' 4
11. The average unrepresented action took thirty-one days. LAA representation ap-
pears to have added fifty-five days (87 minus 32), while the average private counsel added
only twelve days (44 minus 32)-a ratio of 4.6 to 1. See Table I, note 10 supra.
12. A variety of procedural pleadings and motions are available in a summary process
action, for the philosophy of the action is to speed disposition by shortening the time
intervals permitted for pleading rather than by limiting procedural devices tlemselves.
See CONN. Ga. STAT. REV. § 52-534 (Supp. 1969) (providing that pleadings and motions
shall advance at least one step every three business days). Hence, as in any other civil
action in Connecticut, a defense counsel may file: (1) a Plea in Abatement or Motion
to Erase, contesting the court's jurisdiction, 2 CONN. PRACicE BooKs § 92-97 (1966); (2)
a Motion for Oyer, requiring production of the lease by the landlord where he has
alleged that a written lease exists, id. at § 103; (3) a Motion for Production & Dis.
closure, demanding disclosure of any of the landlord's records allegedly material to the
tenant's defense, id. at § 167; (4) a Motion for More Specific Statement, id. at § 99; or
(5) a Motion to Expunge, alleging that the complaint contains unnecessary, obscure,
irrelevant, immaterial, or evidential matter, id. at § 100.
13. Examination of a two-month sample (September and October 1971) indicates
that LAA filed 2.3 pleadings and motions per action (71 pleadings and motions/30 ac-
tions), while for private defense counsel, the average was 1.0 (5/5). While on first im-
pression the 2.3 average may not seem impressive, it must be put in the context of
other unrelated, time-consuming aspects of the process: For example, due to a court
backlog and the fact that motions are heard only on Mondays, a motion generally is
not set down for argument for a week and a half after it is filed. Thus, the filing of
even two motions can increase the time needed for disposition by over three weeks.
Taking an additional one day for a defensive pleading can double the time necessary
to dispose of that pleading. For example, if the complaint is returned on a Thursday,
Day I, defense counsel has until the following Tuesday, Day 6, to respond. On Day
6 landlord's counsel will file a motion for default judgment (for failure to plead), and
if the defense makes no response within another three days (by Friday, Day 9), the
landlord receives a judgment. By waiting until the last day (Day 9) to file his response,
defense counsel can forestall argument until at least Monday, Day 26, for no matter
can be argued on Monday, Day 19, unless it has been filed by the deadline of a week
and a half before (here, Thursday, Day 8).
Of course, procedural advantages can be maximized and disposition delayed not only
by well-timed pleadings, but also by sheer aggressiveness in terms of the number of
pleadings filed. See, e.g., Baxter v. Lombardi, CV # 6-7111-53652 (6th Conn. Cir. Feb.
14, 1972), where the landlord's counsel had to surmount seven LAA pleadings and mo-
tions consuming more than three months.
14. Given the limited defenses available in a summary process action, see note 8
supra, it appears that the landlord, if persistent, can ultimately obtain a judgment of
possession in the great majority of cases. Thus, of the ninety-seven actions defended by
LAA in the sample, judgment was formally entered for the landlord in fifty-three; and
in another twenty-one actions, an agreement or stipulation between the parties was
reached, though the court apparently neglected the formality of entering a corre-
sponding judgment.
In only two actions did the tenant obtain judgment-once by a non-suit and once
after trial on the merits. (In the remaining twenty-two actions, the landlord simply
withdrew the complaint. In these cases, there is no way of determining whether tile
action was terminated because the landlord had obtained satisfaction from the tenant,
because the tenant had vacated, or because the landlord felt his case was too weak to
proceed; the last explanation, however, seems the least probable given the disposition
of the actions that did go to judgment.)
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B. An Explanation of the Data
This tendency--cases involving LAA lawyers to take longer for dis-
position-appears to result from both their freedom from market con-
straints and the economic status of their clients. The tenant who must
pay a private attorney obviously has some interest in terminating the
litigation as soon as possible. By contrast, the LAA-represented tenant
obtains his counsel free; protracted litigation costs him nothing. Thus,
to the extent that a private attorney is constrained by his clients' desire
to avoid excessive legal expense, his actions are influenced by a factor
absent in the decision-making of his LAA counterpart. 15
Moreover, the LAA attorney is dealing with low-income clients1"
for whom protraction of the litigation will often be not only costless,
but even profitable. When a landlord succeeds in a summary process
action, he obtains only a judgment of possession'--that is, the authori-
ty to evict the tenant. If the landlord does evict, or if the tenant vacates
before eviction, with the tenant owing the landlord back rent, the land-
lord must bring a separate action for a money judgment.18
A tenant eligible for LAA representation is not, however, likely to
have sufficient assets to make such a suit worthwhile, and thus passing
on the costs, e.g., the accrual of rent while the action is being litigated,
to the landlord may operate to the tenant's permanent advantage.19
II. Evaluating the Consequences of Increased Disposition Time
At least two arguments can be made to justify the extra time that
LAA clients are able to obtain in eviction actions. First, such delay
may be considered a procedural "band-aid" for bad substantive law.
The Connecticut summary process statutes currently allow the tenant
15. A client who is paying for his counsel will decide whether and to what extent to
pursue a case based on the computation: (value of winning x probability of winning)
- cost of winning = value of litigating. For the recipient of free legal services, of
course, the third factor is absent. Kettelle Report, supra note 2, at ch. 4, at 81.82.
Thus, the Kettelle Report notes that in some cases the costs of litigating to his clients
is so great as to compel the private attorney not to proceed, id.; but Legal Sen ices at-
torneys are free (within their program's budget constraints) to pursue such unremu-
nerative litigation, e.g., for the sake of law reform, see p. 1500 infra.
16. LAA's "basic standard for determining financial eligibility" is the ability to af-
ford a lawyer. LAA Information 1971, at I (mimeograph). For example, during the
period examined, LAA attorneys were instructed not to represent an applicant with
two dependents if his net weekly income was greater than $100 and the estimated cost
of case was less than $250; $105, for a I250 to $500 case; $110, for a case that would
cost more than $500. Id.
17. See note 8 supra.
18. CoNN. GFN. STAT. REv. § 52-236 (1968).
19. Thus, very few landlords pursue their former tenants in a second, se arate
damage action. Interview with LAA and with private attorneys in New Haven, March
27, 1972 and February 21, 1973, respectively (the attorneys requested that their names
be kept confidential).
1499
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 82: 1495, 1973
only limited defenses-a denial of the allegations of the complaint or
the avoidance of the complaint by showing that the eviction is re-
taliatory.20 The tenant may not assert the landlord's breach of any
covenant in the lease, since the tenant's covenants, e.g., to pay rent,
are considered independent of those of the landlord. It may therefore
be argued that the use of procedural complexities is justifiable as a
means of blunting what would otherwise be a drastic and arbitrary
landlord's remedy.21 Second, to the extent that any delay results in a
redistribution of wealth from landlords to tenants,22 it may also be
justified simply as a type of antipoverty program.
20. See note 8 supra. However, this seemingly bleak picture should be qualified by
noting the broad scope of the definition of retaliatory eviction, the equitable discre.
tion vested in the courts to deny the landlord any relief or to grant a stay of execution,
and the inability of the landlord to evict because of nonpayment of rent when lie
fails to possess a required building inspection certificate. See id.
21. See note 8 supra. For a general critique of existing landlord.tenant law, see
Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban Society, 46 J. URiDAN LAW
695 (1969).
22. The following data illustrate the way in which such redistribution may occur.
One of the most prominent New Haven landlords' attorneys, who litigates more suin-
mary process actions than any other in the city, was willing to discuss his cases (with
the understanding that his name be kept confidential). Interview in New Haven, April
12, 1972. An examination of all the actions which he closed in February and March
of 1972 suggests the economic burden placed on landlords by LAA's summary process
activity. In approximately two-thirds of the actions (56 of 82), the landlord and tenant
reached an agreement whereby the tenant paid his back rent and was allowed to re-
main in the apartment. Of the twenty-six remaining actions, the tenant either was
evicted or vacated before eviction. In all of these cases, the tenant left owing rent. Table
III illustrates the distribution and average total indebtedness (including the standard




was evicted or Average debt
vacated before to landlord
Tenant was: Total cases eviction in column 2
Unrepresented 62 17 $389
Privately-represented 3 2 895
LAA-represented 17 7 695
As Table III indicates, the landlord becomes an involuntary creditor of approximately
an extra $300 when he does not conclude a settlement with an LAA-represented tenant.
As a check on the small number of LAA- and privately-represented tenants in Table
III, an additional sample of such cases from this attorney's files was examined. Inter-
view in New Haven, March 21, 1973. Table IV represents cases closed in January, February,
and the first half of March 1973, and indicates the average indebtedness of LAA- and




was evicted or Average debt
vacated before to landlord
Tenant was: Total cases eviction in column 2
Privately-represented 10 2 $395
LAA-represented 12 5 749
Thus, enlarging the data base yields results similar to those in Table III.
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On examination, however, neither of these justifications appears
compelling. To the extent that the use of procedural delay is viewed
as a surrogate for reforming the substantive law, it seems a poor way
to balance the competing interests of landlord and tenant. Presently,
the philosophy of summary process is based on the assumption that the
landlord has a paramount interest in regaining possession. Substantive
and procedural aspects of the action have therefore been limited so
as to give the landlord a speedy remedy.23 On the other hand, the
statutes also establish some measure of protection for the tenant by
compelling the landlord to resort to legal process and not to use self-
help in obtaining evictions.24 If a different balance between such com-
peting interests is to be struck, substantive reform by the legislature
would seem the appropriate method. -Y Moreover, the purposes served
by LAA's summary process policy are only distantly related to sub-
stantive reform. Presumably any rational reform would distinguish
tenants who only want equitable treatment from their landlords from
those who resist eviction purely out of spite. LAA's use of procedural
complexities, however, provides the same advantages to either type of
tenant, so long as he is eligible for free representation. Those ineligible
are left to face the substantive law without being able to use such
rights.
To the extent that LAA's summary process activity redistributes
wealth, its equity is questionable. There is no reason to believe that
the landlords who bear the costs are particularly wealthy; most are
At one time any assertions about additional expenses to landlords from LAA's ac-
tivities would have to be qualified with regard to LAA clients on welfare. In 1969.
the Connecticut Legislature enacted a statute authorizing state welfare authorities in
certain circumstances to deduct accruing rent from a tenant's monthly welfare check
and send it directly to the landlord. CONN. GLv'. STAT. REv. § 17-2f (Supp. 1971). How-
ever, this resulted in a conflict with federal regulations governing state eligibility for
matching funds, and in 1971 the statute was amended so as virtually to eliminate such
direct rental payments. Housing Authority v. White, 29 Conn. Supp. 346, 347, 287 A.2d
644, 646 (1971).
23. See note 8 supra; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (197-0, where the Supreme
Court rejected due process and equal protection challenges to an Oregon summary
process statute:
The tenant is, by definition, in possession of the property of the landlord; unless
a judicially supervised mechanism is provided for . . . swift repossession by the
landlord . . . the tenant would be able to deny the landlord the rights of income
incident to ownership by refusing to pay rent and by preventing sale or rental to
someone else.
Id. at 72.
24. Id. at 71-72. See note 8 supra.
25. There is little reason to believe that the legislatures are closed to such pleas for
reform. For example, in 1969 the Connecticut Legislature provided tenants with af-
firmative defenses to summary process actions. CoNN. GEN . STAT. ANN. § 52.540a (Supp.
1973). See note 8 supra. Even advocates of reform prefer the use of the legislative rather
than the judicial process. See Clough, The Case Against the Doctrine of Independent
Covenants: Reform of Oregon's FED Procedure, 52 O, L. REv. 39, 51, 54 (1972).
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probably of more moderate means. 20 For these landlords the additional
expense involved when litigating against a LAA-represented tenant
may constitute a significant economic hardship.
Moreover, such redistribution may operate, at least marginally, to
decrease the long-run supply of housing available to the poor. To the
extent that landlords are forced to absorb the costs of delay, they will
have an additional incentive to convert their property to non-residen-
tial uses or abandon it entirely.27 One might challenge the argument
26. During the sample period, the most frequent type of landlord involved In a




Low-to-moderate income Co-Ops" 24
Apartment and Realty Companies' 0  66
Housing Authority of the
City of New Haven 96
*As defined by FHA income regulations. See infra.
*"Includes mortgage and investment companies, and banks.
And tenants defended by LAA confront private individual landlords as plaintiffs in
about two of every three cases:
TABLE VI
Tenant was defended by LAA
No. of
Plaintiff was: No. of actions different landlords
Private individual 64 56
Low-to-moderate income Co-Ops9 7 8
Apartment and
Realty Companies" 17 9
Housing Authority of the
City of New Haven 9 1
* "See comments, Table V supra.
There are, unfortunately, no data on the income levels of private New Haven land-
lords. But even LAA does not contend for the stereotype of the private individual
landlord as a "fat cat." Interview with New Haven LAA Director Frederick Danforth,
New Haven, February 23, 1972. Moreover, several studies of landlords in other urban
contexts "cast ...doubt upon the popular stereotype of the rapacious slumlord earning
monopolistic profits."' Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the
Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Distribution Policy, 80 YALE
L.J. 1093, 1099 (1971). See, e.g., W. Grigsby, L. Rosenburg, M. Stegman, & j. Taylor,
HousING AND POVERTY ch. 6 at 6, which finds that in Baltimore "the small and casual
investors . [account] for . . . 60 percent" of private inner-city apartment ownership.
See also G'. STERNLIEB, THE TENAMENT LANDLORD 122-23 (1966), and G. STERNLIEB, Tim
URBAN HOUSING DILEMMA 13-1-13-41 (1966).
Of course, where the landlord is a cooperative, the tenants themselves bear the cost
of a summary process action. In this regard it should be noted that the cooperatives
involved in Table VI receive federal mortgage subsidies, as a condition of which they
are restricted to tenants of low and moderate income. See Department of Housing and
Urban Development, Income Limits for Section 221 D3 BMIR and Exception Income
Limits for Sections 235 and 236 Housing, HPMC-FHA 4400.36A, Connecticut.
27. Cf. Ackerman, supra note 26, at 1111. There are no comprehensive studies of
the rate of abandonment in New Haven. .But studies of other urban centers, particn-
larly older ones, suggest that they face not only the problem of a tight housing market,
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that LAA's summary process activity results in any such wealth redis-
tribution with the contention that landlords maintain a stable profit
margin by passing on additional costs to the consumer.28 But if that
is the case, such delay, though not redistributing wealth away from
landlords, still adversely affects the housing situation of the poor by
increasing its price.2 9
A substantial expenditure of effort by LAA on increasing the time
involved in individual landlord-tenant actions may also raise serious
problems of resource allocation within the program itself. The case
sample examined showed that while LAA represents far more tenants
in summary process actions than all of the city's private attorneys com-
bined, the vast majority of tenants involved in such suits continue to
go unrepresented. 30 Thus, the special measures taken by LAA on be-
half of those tenants it does represent may be at the expense of a large
number of tenants who receive no legal services at all.
III. Remedying the Problem of Procedural Delay
A. Reform Involving External Controls
Consideration might be given to means of strengthening external
control over such programs to reduce the time required for disposition
of cases. First, the present national Legal Services Program could be
abolished and replaced by fifty state corporations funded in whole or
part by the federal government.31 Second, the governors could be given
veto power over particular Program activities in lieu of the far less
discriminate general veto they now possess. 32 Such proposals might in-
crease participation by state and local officials, and bar associations,
but also that of a relatively high rate of abandonment. See Sternlieb, New York's Housing:
A Study in Immobilisme, in HousING AND Ecoxo.tics: TuE A.Murct. DIL.MMtA 496 (M.
Stegman ed. 1970); Note, Abandoned and Vacant Housing Units: Can They Be Used
During Housing Crises?, I N.Y.U. REv. OF Lw & Soc. CHANGE 59 (1971). See also Note.
Retaliatory Evictions: Review and Reform, 1 N.Y.U. REv. OF Lw & Soc. CHANGE 81,
108 (1971).
28. The extent to which landlords can pass on such costs to their tenants depends
on a number of relatively complex market factors. See generally Ackerman, supra note
26. Of course, by definition the costs of delay are passed on, in their entirety, to the
tenant-landlords who live in a cooperative.
29. An analogous argument has been made in the context of consumer credit reform.
See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 103 (1972) (White, J., dissenting); Buchanan. In
Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 64 (1970); Kripke, Consumer Credit Riegu-
lation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 CoLuM. L. REv. 455 (1968). But see Wallace,
The Logic of Consumer Credit Reform, 82 YALE L.J. 461 (1973).
30. See Table I, note 10 supra.
31. Those state organizations would be funded either by revenue sharing or through
the national corporation's budget.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2834 (1970).
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familiar with the problems of their areas. But they also raise the risk
of additional political interference: Officials might well be responsive
to interests and influences not directly related to the merits of indi-
vidual Programs. Both would have broad ramifications for many other
aspects of the Program, and would have to be evaluated in light of
the consequences. And perhaps most important, neither would deal
directly with the underlying problem of the freedom from economic
constraints enjoyed by Legal Services attorneys.
Another possible solution would be for the federal government to
retain control of the Program but for Congress to prohibit grantee
agencies from engaging in summary process litigation.33 A similar at-
tempt to bar criminal representation,3 4 however, has been of question-"
able effectiveness, 35 and the problems in imposing a national prohibi-
tion on litigation defined by varying state statutes seem substantial.
Another restructuring proposal-instituting a judicare system-does
deal with the problem of economic constraints. The LAA attorney
would be replaced by members of the private bar subsidized by the
government for clients who were unable to pay normal fees.30 Though
there has been some largely negative analysis of existing judicare ex-
periments by law reformers,3 7 there has thus far been no assessment of
such programs' impact on the time taken for disposition. It would
seem that were such a program funded through cost reimbursement,
there would be no greater economic constraint on individual at-
torneys; indeed, procedural delay might prove an even greater prob-
lem than at present.38 But if the judicare funding involved reimburse-
33. The prohibition could be broadly phrased to exclude all housing litigation,
whether before administrative agencies or courts, or to exclude only landlord.tenant
litigation in courts, or perhaps only in those trials denominated as "summary" by
state legislatures.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(3) (1970).
35. See. Note, supra note 1, at 253-54. Some local Legal Services agencies avoid the
federal prohibition by using federal money only on civil cases and fluds from other
sources for criminal work. For example, New Haven's criminal cases provide a sub.
stantial portion of its caseload. Indeed, the Director of LAA believes the criminal
caseload is very important to LAA's work. New Haven Register, February 28, 1973,
at 73, col. 7.
36. See generally Pelletier, English Legal Aid: The Successful Experiment in Judicare,
40 U. CoLo. L. REV. 10 (1967); Robb, Alternate Legal Assistance Plans, 14 CATI. LAWIint
127, 135 (1968); Schlossberg & Weinberg, The Role of Judicare in the Anerican Legal
System, 54 A.B.A.J. 1000, 1001 (1968); Utton. The British Legal Aid System, 76 YALE L.J.
371 (1966); AVidiss, Legal Assistance for the Rural Poor: An Iowa Study, 56 IOWA L. REV.
100 (1970) (dealing only with the Iowa program).
37. See, e.g., Goodman & Feuillan, Trouble with Judicare, 58 A.B.A.J. 476 (1972).
For a defense of Judicare, see S. BRAKEL, WISCONSIN JUDICARE: A I'RELIStINAtty AI'l'RAISAL
(1972); Marsh, Neighborhood Law Office or Judicare, 25 LEGAL Am BRIEFCASE 12 (1966);
Preleznik, Wisconsin Judicare: An Experiment in Legal Services, 57 A.B.A.I. 1179 (1971).
38. There might well be problems with extremely high demand, as in the British
case. See generally Utton, The British Legal Aid System, 76 YALE L.J. 371 (1966). For
the difficulties of Medicare-style funding, see H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, MEDICARE AND 'tIIE
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ment on some flat-fee basis, procedural delay might be reduced. The
primary problem with such a flat-fee approach is, of course, that it
would be difficult to insure quality legal services; there would be little
cost-quality control (save the general reputation of the attorney among
a rather inexperienced clientele) over "form-pad" practitioners.
B. Reforming the Existing Structure
1. Budgetary Review
More exacting budgetary review, administrative or legislative, may
be another way to affect LAA's summary process activity.ro Nonethe-
less, simple budget shifts may not be clearly enough delineated to ef-
fect a change in Agency policy, and may produce unexpected or un-
desired results. Rather than the expected alteration of behavior, a com-
pletely different activity may be changed. Summary process attorneys
are, however, unable to agree on the net effect of funding reductions,
and this uncertainty suggests the many intangibles that may frustrate
an attempt to use indiscriminate budget cuts. And again, such reduc-
tions are subject to fluctuation with changes in national or state ad-
ministrations.
2. Internally-imposed Constraints
Another approach would be for Legal Services to adopt some in-
ternal accounting standards that would confront LAA lawyers with
factors similar to the economic inputs influencing private attorneys.
For example, LAA attorneys might be required to project their esti-
mated caseloads for a given fiscal period and assign some fixed fee to
each case. Or the attorneys might be limited in the number of hours
they could spend on a given type of case. The Agency, with or without
HosPrrALs: ISSUES A aD PRosPEcts 242, 247 (1967); Feldstein, An Eronometric Model of
the Medicare System, 85 Q.J. EcoN. 1, 1, 19-20 (No. 1, 1971), Havinghurst. Health
Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health Serices, 33 L. & Co."rsatt. Pnon.
716, 790 (1970).
39. For example, in 1972 Connecticut Governor Thomas Meskill sharply reduced
state funding of LAA. To have continued the same 1971 level of services (see note 7 supra).
the 1972 budget would have required approximately $950,00O. Interview with Frederick
Danforth, in New Haven, October 19, 1972. The actual 1972 budget was only 838.891.
Nearly the entire reduction was due to lower funding by Connecticut's Department of
Community Affairs, which dropped from $138,129 in 1971, to $45,110 in 1972. Intervie,"
with Frederick Danforth, in New Haven, October 19, 1972; New Haven Register. March
1, 1973, at 31, col. 3. Estimated 1973 funding levels were between $650.000 and S700,000.
Id. at 31, col. 4. As a consequence, LAA eliminated twenty-five percent of its staff at-
torneys, Interview with LAA attorney C, in New Haven, October 19. 1972, and four of
the six offices were closed, New Haven Register, February 28, 1973, at 1, col. 5.
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external review, would then establish floors and ceilings on the total
amount of resources to be expended in each area.
Under such a system LAA attorneys would probably represent more
summary process clients but spend less time on each case. However,
such internal pricing suffers from several obvious weaknesses. The ad-
ditional administrative costs engendered by this system might be of
sufficient magnitude to cast considerable doubt on its effectiveness.
Moreover, the standards prescribed might be inaccurate, or, more im-
portantly, might not reflect the clientele's desires.40
Second, a price analogue would also be vulnerable to political man-
ipulation and pressure. The Kettelle Report identified such a political
problem in the allocative decisions between law reform activities and
legal "first aid."4' The local political pressures that could be applied
under an internal pricing device would be more precisely targeted
than external budget manipulations, but potentially no less destructive.
C. Discouraging Delay Through Ethical Constraints
A third general approach to the problem would involve revising the
ethical constraints of the American Bar Association Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility.4 2 Although the Code now contains general state-
ments about attorney practice with regard to delay, these statements
are vague, and do not seem to be strictly enforced. 43
One possible solution would be to revise Ethical Consideration 7-14
40. See Winter, Property, Economic Equality and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972
Sup. CT. REV. 41, 66-77.
41. Kettelle Report, supra note 3, at ch. 4, at 82, 83.
42. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1971) [here-
inafter cited as ABA CODE].
43. Presently Canon Seven of the Code admonishes attorneys to "represent a client
zealously within the bounds of the law." Canon 7, ABA CODE 24. The "Ethical Con.
siderations" and "Disciplinary Rules" developed to implement this general charge pres-
ently require that the ethical practitioner refrain from filing frivolous, Ethical Con-
sideration 7-4, ABA CODE 24, or harassing motions, Ethical Consideration 7.10, ABA
CODE 25; treat other parties to the action with consideration, Disciplinary Rule
7-102(A)(1), ABA CODE 27; follow generally accepted practices, Ethical Consideration
7-38, ABA CODE 27; and accede to the reasonable requests of an adversary which are
not'prejudicial to his client's rights, Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A)(1), ABA CODE 27.
Neither the formal nor informal opinions of the ABA substantially clarify these
considerations. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMITErE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES (1967 & Supps.);
OPINIONS OF THE COMMITrEES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF TIlE ASSOCIATION OF TIlE B AR
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOClArlON (1956);
Opinions of the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 324,
"Legal Aid Agencies," rendered August 9, 1970, reported in 56 A.B.A.J. 1168 (1970). The
Opinion, however, focused its attention on "unpopular" causes, law reform activities,
class suits, and similar controversial activities of legal aid groups (making no distinction
between publicly and privately funded organizations). The Committee stated that gen-
eral policy-making by local Program governing boards is permissible, and that the situa-
tion it sought to prevent was case-by-case, client-by-client regulation and supervision
by such boards. Id. at 1170.
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with a view to applying it to Legal Services attorneys. The Considera-
tion now provides:
A government lawyer in a civil action or administrative proceed-
ing. . . should not use his position or the economic power of the
government to harass parties or to bring about unjust settlements
or results.44
It seems reasonable to argue that while their resources are not as large
as the government prosecutors or agency attorneys the Consideration
had in mind, LAA lawyers do possess a greater degree of independence
than most private attorneys because of their freedom from traditional
market constraints.
But even under such a more stringent standard, difficult issues re-
garding the validity of a defense, the number and type of the plead-
ings, and the attitude of the attorneys in settling or litigating cases
would undoubtedly remain. Such questions, when coupled with the
understandable reluctance of lawyers to file ethical complaints, suggest
that the effect of even revised ethical considerations on the problem
would be uncertain at best. Nevertheless, the general proposition that
Legal Services attorneys may deserve special ethical provisions to re-
flect their special freedom from economic constraints would appear to
merit further consideration.
D. Revising the Law of Summary Process
There are two broad approaches toward developing a "fail-safe" law
of summary process., The first would be to simply eliminate or sub-
stantially reduce the pre-trial pleadings.4 5 While such procedural safe-
guards undoubtedly were originally intended to protect tenants, sever-
al states have found that they can limit procedural complexity without
putting undue burdens on tenants.4 0 Yet while such reform may be
possible, it also seems a rather short-run solution.
A more fruitful approach might be to eliminate the very incentive
44. Ethical Consideration 7-14, ABA CODE 25.
45. See note 13 supra for the relevant Connecticut pleadings. The most likely candi-
dates for elimination include the motions for Default for Failure to Plead, for Produc-
tion and Disclosure, and for Oyer.
46. In Oregon, no continuance will be granted for longer than two days, OMs. Rrx. STAT.
§ 105.135 (1953) unless sufficient bond is posted, in which case trial will be held in
six days, OmE. REv. STAT. § 105.140 (1953). Florida's statute similarly limits the number
of pre-trial pleadings, and provides that motions for discovery will not postpone the
time of trial. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 51.011 (1972). See generally Boyer & Groble. Reform of
Landlord-Tenant Statutes to Eliminate Self-Help in Evicting Tenants, 22 MIAMI- L REv.
800 (1968). Courts in Georgia are also required to move speedily to judgment. hopefully
within one month of the litigation's commencement. GA. CODE AN. § 61-03 (1970).
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for increasing the time involved before disposition by requiring the
defending tenant to continue paying rent to a judicial escrow ac-
count.47 Connecticut 48 and several other states49 presently provide for
just such an escrow procedure in disputes over health, safety, and hous-
ing code violations. The extension of the procedure to suits over pos-
session would appear to be a workable compromise which would in-
sure that a prevailing landlord would eventually receive the back rent
due, while allowing the tenant to exercise any procedural safeguard
he and his attorney feel is justified.50 Problems of administration could
arise,5x but a general rule which decrees that if the tenant fails to com-
ply with the escrow arrangement the landlord will be awarded im-
mediate possession should prove effective.52
E. Eliminating the Adversaries' Attorneys
Legal Services was in part established to equalize the legal position
of the poor vis-h-vis the landlord by providing them with free counsel.
It would be possible to achieve the same type of equalization by re-
47. A recently-revised Georgia statute, for example, provides that where the question
of possession cannot be resolved within one month, the tenant must pay into a judicial
escrow account. GA. CODE ANN. § 61-304 (1972). Amounts required include rents due
after the issuance of the dispossessory warrant, id. at § 61-304(a), and also all prior
rents allegedly owed. Id. at § 61-304(b). If the amounts are disputed, the court decides
the proper amount payable.
48. In Connecticut, local boards of health or other authorities (defined in CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 19-347(a) (1968)) established by local governments may seek the ap-
pointment by the Court of Common Pleas ot a receiver of rents. Id. at § 19.347(b). These
receivers are appointed to repair conditions which, in the opinion of the Board of
Health or other authority, are dangerous to safety or health, as defined in id. at §
19-344 or § 19-347. These provisions are not applicable in summary process, nor can
they be invoked by tenants, acting for themselves.
49. N.Y. REAL PROP. Acrio.s §§ 769-82 (1965). These statutes, applicable to the
occupants of multiple dwellings in New York City, allocate rents to remedy unsafe or
unhealthy conditions. The action must be initiated by one-third or more of the tenants
in a multiple dwelling, id. at § 770, as defined by the statute, id. at § 782. Somewhat
similar provisions exist for all cities with a population in excess of 400,000. N.Y. MuLtr.
DWELL. LAW § 302-a (Supp. 1972). The question of possession is not adjudicated in these
proceedings, but is resolved under other provisions, N.Y. REAL PROP. AarrloNs §§ 701-67
(1965), providing for hearing within five to twelve days after the commencement of
the action. Id. at § 731. No escrow is contemplated under this procedure. The Massa-
chusetts statutes also contemplate escrow rent payments when the issue is unsafe or
unhealthy conditions. MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 111, § 127F (1965). Pennsylvania recently
enacted a similar procedure. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-01 (Supp. 1969).
50. See, e.g., Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1070, 1071 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (Wright, J., endorsing escrow concept).
51. See C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 335-52 (1968); Note, Tenant Rent Strikes,
3 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 1 (1967); Note, Pennsylvania's Rent Withholding Law, 73
DICK. L. REV. 583 (1969); Note, St. Louis Public Housing Rent Strike-A Model for In-
ducing Community Action, 28 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 111 (1970); Note, Rent Withholding
-A Proposal for Legislation in Ohio, 18 WST. RES. L. REV. 1705 (1967).
52. Georgia provides for this solution. GA. CODE ANN. § 61-303(c) (1970). It is ad-
mittedly often difficult to determine whether the tenant is late in his payment or has
failed to make payment in violation of the statute. The answer would seem to lie with
the court's discretion.
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ducing the legal advantages of the poor's adversary. 33 Thus, one pos-
sible strategy for dealing with the present problem would be to create
special summary process courts which would be closed to lawyers of
both the landlord and the tenant5 4 Such courts would operate without
formal pleadings, motions, or the technical rules of evidence; the judge
would assume complete control of the hearing, 55
The change from present summary process proceedings would be
substantial. There would be an early hearing and speedy judgnent.5a
The litigants themselves would present the usually simple facts, and
the judge would merely decide if the tenant has any adequate defense.5 7
The lawyerless court would thus be a version of the typical small
claims court-and similar objections might be applicable."8 It may be
argued that the landlord would inevitably be more articulate than his
adversary, and that the tenant would be reluctant, because of his al-
leged general fear of legal institutions, to assert his position. Inade-
quate attention might be given the less articulate tenant's rights, and
the courts might act as little more than eviction agencies.59
Inarticulateness has not, however, proved an obstacle to competent
53. See Hazard, Rationing Justice. 8 J. L.,w & EcoN. 1, 8 (1969).
54. The Oregon statute bars interference by anyone other than the plaintiff and de-
fendant without permission of the judge in the case. ORE. REV. STAT. S 53.090 (1953).
California's provision is very similar. CAra'. CIV. PRo. CODE § 117g (1955). Both provisions
forbid not only court appearances, but also out-of-court assistance to litigants by at-
torneys. To overcome whatever technical legal difficulties might arise, the clerks of the
court might give the parties assistance, thus obviating the need for out-of-court as-
sistance. These statutes have been consistently upheld by the courts so long as the
right of appeal is preserved. The California Small Claims Act's provision barring at-
torneys was attacked on due process grounds in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Small Claims
Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 379 (1946). The court held that exclusion of counsel from such
tribunals did not abridge due process, so long as the exclusion was not arbitrary. The
more pragmatic rationale for excluding attorneys is that small claims courts are quite
capable of conducting their business without them. Note, Small Claims Courts, 34
COLUM. L. REv. 932; 938 (1934).
55. Note, supra note 54, at 937.
56. The defenses allowed in possessory disputes would vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. See note 5 supra.
57. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64-67 (1972) (noting the simplicity of issues
which the Oregon courts face in forcible entry and detainer cases).
58. See generally Robinson, A Small Claims Court in Chicago's New Circuit Court,
44 CHI. BAR REcoRD 421 (1963); Note, The California Small Claims Court, 52 QLIF. L.
Rev. 932 (1959); Buyer v. Seller in Small Claims Courts, 36 CoNsu.1ER REroRTs 624 (1971).
Apparently only one jurisdiction, Pittsburgh, has established a court specifically for
housing disputes. Clough, supra note 25, at 52. This court, however, deals only with
violations of local housing and building codes, Comay, The City of Pittsburgh Housing
Court, 30 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 459, 460 (1969), and employs normal lenns)lania pleading
and practice. Id. at 472-73. This court is thus dissimilar to the proposed court.
59. See Note, Small Claims Courts as Collection Agencies, 4 STAN. L. Ray. 237 (1952),
which reaches essentially this conclusion. One earlier study reaches a contrary result.
Clark & O'Connell, The Working of the Hartford Small Claims Court, 3 CoNN. BAR J.
123, 129 (1929). See also Note, Small Claims in Indiana, 3 IND. LEGAL FoRuM 517 (1970);
Note, The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as Performed by
the Small Claims Court in California, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1657 (1969).
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adjudication in courts barring attorneys. 0 Judges typically become
familiar with the differences in the litigants' abilities to present their
cases. Also, as the judges would deal with a limited field of landlord-
tenant law, they should become far better acquainted with it than those
judges in the more generalized small claims courts." Indeed, much of
the present concern for the inarticulate litigant is limited to small
claims courts with non-lawyer judges, and their failings need not be
repeated in the proposed summary process courts.
Since the landlord-tenant court would be mandatory, both parties
would be allowed to appeal.0 2 This right of appeal does not, however,
mean reintroducing time-consuming litigation. Bond0 3 could be re-
quired on appeal, most logically the value of the rent,0 4 to insure no
tenant default after an adverse appellate ruling. Legal Services would
thus still have a role in aiding poor tenants on appeal, although not
at the trial court level. Some tenants would prevail at trial and would
not appeal; not every unsuccessful tenant would appeal; and since the
court would have power to make such orders as the judge deems "just
and equitable for the disposition of the controversy,""5 satisfactory com-
60. In small claims courts "[h]istrionic appeals are fruitless, since there is no jury.
The subtleties of pleading and technicalities of trial procedure are laid aside and an
attempt is made to approximate a just result ...." Note, Small Claims Courts: Reform
Revisited, 5 COLUM. J. OF LAW & SOCIAL PRODS. 47, 55-56 (No. 2, 1969). The Ralph Nader
study of small claims courts similarly concludes that with proper assistance provided
by the court, e.g., convenient session hours, the barring of attorneys would be desirable.
THE SMALL CLAIMS STUDY GROUP, LITTLE INJUSTICES, SMALL CLAIMS COURTS AND TIE
AMERICAN CONSUMER 95-114 (1972).
61. The same point is made with regard to proposed consumer courts in Buyer v.
Seller in Small Claims Courts, 36 CONSUMER REPORTS 624 (1971). Some small claims
courts handle landlord-tenant matters, Id. at 629. Such a strategy would be appropriate
for states without a substantial population housed in rental dwellings. In more heavly
urbanized areas, however, a separate housing court would seem appropriate. Statler, Small
Claims Courts in Texas: Paradise Lost, 47 TEX. L. REv. 448, 454-55 (1969).
62. Appeal is not, however, required for due process. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56, 77 (1972). One Bar Association recommended specifically that no appeals be al.
lowed from its proposed consumer court. THE SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIR$,
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, TOWARD TIE INFORMAL
RESOLUTION OF CONSUMER DISPUTES 11 (1972) (citing cases in support of proposition that
appeal is not required for due process). In California and Oregon, only the defendant
may appeal from the judgment of a small claims court. CALIF. CIV. PRO. CODE § 117 (1955);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 55.110 (1953). Since the plaintiff voluntarily submits to the court's
jurisdiction, eliminating his appeal does not violate due process; since the defendant was
involuntarily subjected to jurisdiction, appeal must be available to him. Superior Weeler
Cake Corp. v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. 384, 264 P. 488 (1928); Skaff v. Small Claims
Court. 68 Cal. 2d 79 (1968), Prudential Insurance Co. v. Small Claims Court, 76 Cal,
App. 2d 379 (1946).
63. See, e.g., for small claims courts, ORE. REV. STAT. § 55.120 (1953), which provides
appeals within ten days to the circuit court without a jury, and no further appeals al.
lowed; CALIF. CIv. PRO. CODE § 117j (1955) provides for appeals within ten days, tile
appellant to pay superior court filing fees, any adverse judgment, plus $15 attorneys' fees.
64. Bond could also include the adverse party's attorneys' fees if, for example, Legal
Services attorneys appealed as a matter of course. For Connecticut's current appeal bond
from summary process see note 46 supra.
65. ORE. REv. STAT. § 55.090 (1953).
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promise would often occur, and no appeal would be pursued. Hence,
the volume of cases reaching Legal Services would be substantially
reduced.
Also, for tenant-appellants the security would eliminate any advan-
tages inherent in extended litigation. The lawyerless court would also
have the advantage of equalizing legal resources among tenants. Neith-
er those with private counsel nor those now represented by LAA would
have any advantage over the great majority of tenants now unrepresent-
ed. The lawyerless court would thus have effects extending beyond the
problem of LAA summary process activities: Indeed, it may prove the
most attractive remedy precisely because it addresses as well problems
of allocating judicial resources, legal representation, and "citizen par-
ticipation."
IV. Conclusion
In observing that the presence of LAA attorneys in summary process
litigation leads to additional time to reach disposition (with its at-
tendant costs to landlords, unrepresented tenants, or both) this Note
has focused on the impact of only one Legal Services agency in but one
type of litigation. It would be inappropriate to extend its conclusions
to other aspects of the national Legal Services Program without further
investigation. Freedom from economic constraints may, however, have
analogous effects in other areas.60 Further empirical investigation will
be necessary to determine whether the types of reforms suggested here
are appropriate.
66. For an expression of some tentative misgivings on the abuses of free counsel in
the criminal area, see Argersinger v. Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25, 58.59 (1972) (Powell. J.. con-
curring). Justice Powell's concerns are especially interesting as he, as President of the
ABA, was a key supporter of Legal Services in its early stages.
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